Text Structure and textlinguistics

While employed here as an instrument of translation analysis, textlinguistic methods were from the start devised to ascertain structure and rhetorical content of texts regardless of classifications such as 'literary' vs. 'nonliterary'. In the framework of translation theory, they serve on the one hand to facilitate a translator's understanding of the source text, thus ensuring a higher degree of rhetorical equivalence between source and target text; on the other hand, they provide a methodology for the assessment of extant translations.

   Before turning to the detailed structure of a sample text (in this case, the first chapter of al-Kindí's Al-falsafat al-úlá), I would like to propose a (tentative) division of the chapter into texts, defined as "a coherent and cohesive unit, realised by one or more than one sequence of mutually relevant elements, and serving some overall rhetorical purpose." (Hatim/Mason 1990, p.178). The key concept in this somewhat fuzzy definition is rhetorical purpose: whereas elements as the smallest rhetorically relevant unit (roughly coinciding with clauses or sentences) and sequences or chunks (made up of one or more elements) only provide building blocks and cannot in themselves fully express rhetorical purposes (they only contribute to their formulation), texts represent rhetorically 'complete' parts of linguistic phenomena, be they telephone conversations, newspaper articles or novels. As will be seen in what follows, neither rhetorical purposes nor the texts and text types they give rise to are as clear-cut and unambiguous as one would hope.

   Apart from textual features mandated by the genre al-Kindí appears to be emulating here, i.e. a religious treatise addressed to an influential patron, three main lines of argument emerge: al-Kindí first outlines his subject in general terms and introduces a number of crucial concepts, identifying 'First philosophy' as his subject matter; he then duly notes his indebtedness to previous philosophers and their contribution towards the attainment of 'truth'. While finally outlining the correct method to reach philosophical knowledge, he plugs in a long condemnation of scholars opposing philosophy, closing it with a demonstration that his detractors have to avail themselves of 'philosophical' arguments in order to refute him. The importance his angry railings against his opponents have for him are underlined by their reappearance in what I hold to be the last text of the chapter, the final plea for divine assistance.

   The argumentative structure of text 2 unfolds in a highly hybrid manner, defying both the characteristics of a conceptual exposition and an argumentation; neither do we have a clearly established subject whose aspects are being described with a number of assertions, nor do we have a clear-cut proposition that is being countered or supported with arguments. Element 1, the fronting statement, could be taken both as a scene-setter, introducing the subject of an exposition, or the thesis at the heart of an argumentation:

Inna a'lá s-siná'áti l-insáníyati manzilatan, wa-ashrafahá murattabatan, siná'atu l-falsafati, llatí hadduhá 'ilmu l-ashyá'i bi-haqá'iqihá bi-qadri táqati l-insáni;

It is followed by a substantiation introduced by li-anna, suggesting the familiar schema of through-argumentation:

li-anna gharada l-faylasúfu fí 'ilmihí isábata l-haqqi, wa-fí 'amalihí l-'amala bi-l-haqqi;

The schema is cut short, however; following is what seems to be a digression to elaborate on the concept of 'amal. It again displays the structure of a through-argument with a proposition and substantiation:

lá l-fi'la sarmadan, li-anná numsiku, wa-yansarimu l-fi'lu, idhá ntahayná ilá l-haqq.

The apparent topic shift from a general definition of philosophy to an account of 'illa as a central concept of al-Kindí's philosophical thinking in the following element indicates the beginning of the next sequence or chunk. Though this sequence could be interpreted as part of the previous textual chunk, the shift of subject matter and the shift of subject - impersonal concepts make room for 'us', the philosophers - seems to justify detaching it as an independent unit. Again, the sequence is structured on the lines of a through-argument:

Wa-lasná najidu matlúbátiná mina l-haqqi min ghayri 'illatin,

The thesis is amplified by a hál-clause which figures as the thesis of another micro-argument with appended substantiation. As a whole, the element functions as the substantiation of the higher-level through-argument:

wa-'illatu wujúdi kulli shay'in wa-thabátihí l-haqqu, li-anna kulla má lahú inníyatun lahú haqiqatun,

Contrary to the previous arguments, this one closes with a conclusion, thus fully conforming to the through-argument pattern. On the syntactic level, fa and idhan serve as formal indicators for a logical consequence derived from the preceding text:

fa-l-haqqu dtiráran mawjúdun idhan li-inníyatin mawjúda.

The conclusion not only terminates the current sequence, it points back to the incomplete argument of the first sequence and could be meant to provide additional substantiation for it. In this way, both argumentative coherence and textual cohesion are upheld.

Much more palpably than in the last sequence, the following element introduces a new topic and, with it, the third sequence:

Wa-ashrafu l-falsafati wa-a'láhá murattabatani l-falsafatu l-úlá, a'ní 'ilma l-haqqi l-awwali lladhí huwa 'illatu kulli haqq.

Textual cohesion is established by the structural and lexical parallels between the first element of chunk 1 and the current element, arranged in a neat chiasmus: a'lá s-siná'áti [...] wa-ashrafahá murattabatan => ashrafu l-falsafati wa-a'láhá murattabatan. Reversing the usual order of thesis - substantiation - conclusion, al-Kindí spells out his conclusion first

Wa-li-dhálika yajibu an yakúna l-faylasúfu t-támmu l-ashrafu huwa l-mar'a l-muhíta bi-hádhá l-'ilmi l-ashrafi,

before supplying two elements substantiating it, i.e.

li-anna 'ilma l-'illati ashrafu min 'ilmi l-ma'lúli; li-anná inna-má na'limu kulla wáhidin mina l-ma'lúmati 'ilman támman idhá nahnu ahatná bi-'ilmi 'illatihí.

The constant use of conjunctions and particles allows the reconstruction of the flow of argument in this particular sequence; the relation of the following sequence to the previous text, however, is somewhat obscured by the seemingly unmotivated use of li-anna:

Li-anna kulla 'illatin immá an takúna 'unsuran, wa-immá súratan, wa-immá fá'ilatan - a'ní má minhú mabda'u l-harakati - wa-immá mutammimatan, a'ní má min ajlihí kána sh-shay'u;

The enumeration of types of 'illa is followed by a list of corresponding questions; their relevance is signalled by the parallel polysyndetic wa-immá-expressions:

wa-l-matálibu l-'ilmíyatu arba'atun, ka-má haddadná fí ghayri mawdi'in min aqáwíliná l-falsafíyati: immá hal, wa-immá má, wa-immá ayyun, wa-immá li-ma.

The following fa introduces an explanation of the questions listed above. The first two elements of the list are connected by way of a condensed argument illustrating their conceptual relationship: hal inquires into a thing's existence - every existent thing falls under a jins - má asks for that very jins. Subsequent clauses are appended with coordinating was.

fa-ammá "hal" fa-innahá báhithatun 'ani l-inníyati faqat; fa-ammá kullu inníyatin lahá jinsun, fa-inna l-"má" tabhathu 'an jinsihá; wa-"ayyun" tabhathu 'an faslihá, wa-"má" wa-"ayyun" jamí'an tabhatháni 'an naw'ihá; wa-"lima" 'an 'illatihá t-tamámíyati, idh hiya báhithatun 'ani l-'illati l-mutlaqa.

With his digression about interrogative pronouns and particles out of the way, al-Kindí points out the logical relations between the concepts he has introduced in the course of the current sequence; the parallelism of the following clauses only strengthens the impression of logical consistency and completeness:

Wa-bayyinun anná matá ahatná bi-'ilmi 'unsurihá fa-qad ahatná bi-'ilmi jinsihá, wa-matá ahatná bi-'ilmi súratihá fa-qad ahatná bi-'ilmi naw'ihá. wa-fí 'ilmi n-naw'i 'ilmu l-fasl.

At the end of the sequence, al-Kindí pulls together the concepts developed so far and relates them to his definition of philosophy proposed at the very beginning of text 2: 'ilmu l-ashyá'i bi-haqá'iqihá.

Fa-idhá ahatná bi-'ilmi 'unsurihá wa-súratihá wa-'illatihá t-tamámíyati fa-qad ahatná bi-'ilmi haddihá. Wa-kullu mahdúdin fa-haqíqatuhú fí haddihí.

Philosophy in general is taken care of now; 'First philosophy' is positioned in this framework, stressing again its paramount importance. Both the expression bi-haqqin and the formulaic enumeration of the second sentence convey a sense of quasi-religious awe.

Fa-bi-haqqin má summiya 'ilmu l-'illati l-úlá "l-falsafata l-úlá", idh jamí'u má fí l-falsafati muntawin fí 'ilmihá. Wa-idhan hiya úlá bi-sh-sharafi, wa-úlá bi-l-jinsi, wa-úlá bi-t-tartíbi min jihati sh-shay'i l-ayqani 'ilmíyatan, wa-úlá bi-z-zamáni, idh hiya 'illatu z-zamán.

On the basis of my (cursory) examination of text 2 and my reading of the complete chapter, I would venture to roughly classify the opening chapter of the Falsafat al-úlá on the following lines:

• Field: theologico-philosophical essay, expounding philosophical concepts and condemning opposing scholars;
• Tenor: detached and authoritative conceptual exposition shot through with evaluative passages and reader appeals;
• Channel: written treatise, addressed to political and financial backer;
• Pragmatics: expounding an unfamiliar subject matter to a sympathetic audience ('monitoring') and enlisting their aid against opposing factions ('managing');
• Semiotics: quasi-theological expository text, sharing markers of discourse and genre with contemporary religious writings.

   Some points in the above list invite comment. Firstly, the pragmatic aspect of the chapter can only be evaluated on the basis of the text alone; lacking secondary evidence, the text itself is our only source for the author's intention. Both pragmatic and semiotic assumptions are the result of an interpretation of the textual evidence and therefore open to criticism. Nevertheless, the evidence for the pragmatic interpretation I have subjected the chapter to seems convincing: text 2, an exposition of the basic concepts al-Kindí is going to deal with in his Risála, combines an expository macro structure, enumerating and explaining philosophical concepts, with condensed micro-arguments as its building blocks. Each step of the exposition consists of through-arguments, some of which are formally 'closed' with a conclusion. The impression the audience is left with is one of forceful authority. From the very start, al-Kindí claims the high ground of explaining 'truth'; since there cannot be any consistent counter-argument against 'truth', he can completely dispense with a treatment of his opponents' arguments. And since the 'truth' he is trying to impart to his audience cannot be but clear and logical, there is no need to argue it; it is perfectly sufficient to elucidate the logical relationships obtaining between the relevant concepts. Syntactical and lexical parallels and recurrences between elements, sequences and texts (markers of intertextuality inside a single text) of the chapter facilitate the retrieval of these logical relationships and help the reader to become familiar with key ideas through constant repetition.

   Keeping this attitude towards his subject in mind, the acerbic tone of text 4 no longer appears to be slightly out of place in a mainly expository piece of text: given the rationality and clarity and, according to al-Kindí, incontrovertible validity of philosophical truth, the stubborn opposition against his ideas put up by rival scholars cannot but shock and outrage the author. His detractors are not just immune to specific arguments; they seem to be immune to the precepts of logic itself, situating themselves outside the sphere of discourse al-Kindí operates in. Worse, they debase their common subject matter, i.e. the highest truth - God. Under these circumstances, the accusation of kufr levelled against "man tajara bi-d-dín" develops almost logically from the preceding discussion. If not even the force of the word can subvert his opponents, it seems only too legitimate to appeal to a higher authority against them, be it those in power (sequence 4.3) or God Himself (sequence 5.1).

   On the semiotic side, my contention that al-Kindí's prose shares numerous traits with contemporary theological writings still rests, notwithstanding a more thorough investigation, on very weak foundations. To prove my suspicion, several approaches look promising: starting with the text's lexis, key expressions and turns of phrase could be cross-checked against both Qur'ánic linguistic usage and the terminologies of contemporary theological texts. An analysis of these texts in terms of their textlinguistic features should unearth enough evidence for a meaningful comparison of al-Kindí's language and style with that of the scholars he portrays as 'traffickers in religion'. With al-Kindí so forcefully trying to establish a foothold in the field of theological discussions with his philosophical discourse, it would not be too much of a surprise to find him using the same language as his opponents. Recasting key terms of those discussions according to his own thought would be the most straightforward procedure to enhance the legitimacy of his ideas. Such a comparative analysis of terminologies would at the same time yield valuable information for an assessment of semiotic factors such as intertextual references or the classification of the respective texts according to genre and discourse. Apart from that, they provide additional information about pragmatic intentions (such as 'hijacking' his opponents discourse).

   From the point of view of translation, even this cursory look at al-Kindí's introductory chapter has brought to light two rhetorical aspects that any translation would have to grapple with in order to achieve rhetorical equivalence:

1. The chapter displays a logical unity that includes even those elements that at first notice appear to be either unmotivated (e.g. his railings against opponents) or mandated by generic constraints rather than conscious auctorial choice (e.g. his request for God's assistance). In the first case, the portrayal of his detractors as blasphemous ignoramuses rests on his characterization of 'First philosophy' as a subject by nature suffused with logicality and clarity. Thus, opponents cannot but be illogical and confused. In the second case, the very lack of rationality his opponents suffer from makes it impossible to convince them by means of rational argument alone. The state or God have to step in and restore both the dignity of truth and their own dignity, threatened as it is by blasphemy and irrational slander. The rhetorical flow of the chapter is maintained by numerous intertextual references and recurrences; this interplay between textual cohesion and conceptual coherence has to be reflected in a translation.
2. Very much in spite of the opposition philosophical speculation aroused in al-Kindí's time, an opposition that made itself felt even while philosophy was tolerated and supported by the authorities, al-Kindí at no point enters into a discussion with his rivals, let alone mention their specific arguments. He proclaims his ideas from the vantage point of authority, utterly convinced that his ideas represent the 'truth' - thus, there cannot be any other valid point of view worth contending with. His confidence is mirrored in the detached, authoritarian tenor of the chapter, a tone that does not even fail him when he has to acknowledge the existence of rivals. The recriminations he levels against them ooze scorn and contempt - and a healthy dose of righteous indignation about a state of affairs that has them remaining in positions of power and authority. This tone is very much part of the rhetorical thrust of the chapter and has to make its way into a translation.